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Are Rules Really Better Than Standards?
by
JOSEPH

R. GRODIN*

Professor Kelso has provided a useful compendium and evaluation of suggestions for unburdening California's appellate courts, and
for the most part I share his views. However, one suggestion that
Kelso endorses heartily-indeed, he calls it "the most important thing
appellate courts can do to reduce not only their own caseloads, but
also the burden placed upon trial courts"'-invites more careful scrutiny. It is that appellate courts "[develop] stable, certain, and predictable rules of law"; 2 and that they do so through a general preference
for "rules" rather than "standards." According to Professor Kelso,
courts should have preferred (to use his examples) the old "stop, look,
and listen" rule to the standard of "reasonableness" for determining
the plaintiff's right to recover for injury at a railroad crossing; they
should have stayed with the former "clear rule" forbidding recovery
for negligent infliction of emotional distress absent aggravation of personal injury or property damage, rather than move toward the more
recent multi-factored balancing test; they should have stuck with contributory negligence rather than adopt comparative negligence standards; and they should have avoided the "confusing" qualities of
modem products liability law and assumption of risk doctrines.
It is not my intent here to debate the merits of particular doctrines; what I question, rather, is the wisdom of advising appellate
judges that they should routinely opt for the particular kinds of doctrines favored by Professor Kelso for their asserted clarity and simplicity as a means of ameliorating judicial workloads. The advice, for
a number of reasons, seems problematic.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. B.A.,
University of California at Berkeley; J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D., Labor Law and Labor
Relations, London School of Economics. Associate Justice, California Supreme Court,
1982-87.
1. J. Clark Kelso, A Report on the CaliforniaAppellate System, 45 HASTNGS L.J.
433, 450 (1994).
2. Id.
[569]

HeinOnline -- 45 Hastings L.J. 569 1993-1994

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

To begin with, judicial economy seems a questionable basis for
formulating common-law legal doctrine. Stability, certainty, and predictability are obvious values in a legal system. Such values promote
confidence in the rule of law, and likely make the resolution of disputes a less costly enterprise. Parties to litigation understand that, or
they should, and legislatures might well decide that the enforcement
3
of particular principles through litigation costs more than it is worth.
But to tell a party that he is going to lose because the courts have
decided that the application of otherwise appropriate principles would
take too much of their time is not likely to be seen as a manifestation
of justice.
It must also be taken into account that a preference for rules over
standards is likely to favor the protection of certain interests over
others. In the area of criminal procedure, for example, a preference
for clear bright lines (with respect to application of the Miranda warning rule or the rule requiring warrants for searches, for example) is
likely to favor criminal defendants over prosecutors. One could think
of rules that would favor tort plaintiffs over defendants (per se rules
of liability, for example), but that is not true of Professor Kelso's examples. The premise underlying Professor Kelso's prescription seems
to be that the best means of avoiding tort litigation is by cutting down
on the plaintiff's chance for recovery. Indeed, his choice of contributory negligence over comparative negligence does not seem to be justified by a preference for rules over standards at all (since the criteria
for determining negligence can hardly be called a rule), nor for certainty over unpredictability, but rather by a preference for the standard that gives the plaintiff less chances of winning, and therefore less
incentive (to use Professor Kelso's metaphor for jury trials) "to give a
throw of the litigation dice."' 4 It is indisputable that cutting back on
people's legal rights, and hence on their chance of legal success, will
cut back on their incentive to litigate. An enormous body of litigation
could be avoided by eliminating the laws that prohibit discrimination
in employment, for example. The question is whether cutting back on
the plaintiff's chance to recover is a general policy that appellate
courts should be advised to adopt.
3. For that matter, a legislature might do a whole lot of things likely to have greater
effect in reducing the work of courts than manipulating doctrine. I suspect that the efficiency to be gained by following Professor Kelso's advice is trivial compared to what might
be gained by removing whole categories of cases from the courts (drunk driving, prostitution, and debt collection cases, for example) and shifting them to an administrative
tribunal.
4. Id. at 449.
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Apart from the built-in bias effect that a general preference for
rules over standards may have in certain areas, there is the question
whether what passes for a "rule" really provides greater certainty and
predictability. The answer depends, of course, upon how the rule is
formulated, and upon the sharpness of its edges. Consider, for example, what Professor Kelso characterizes as the "clear rule" in Amaya v.
Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.5 requiring aggravation of personal injury or property damage as a condition to recovery for emotional distress. As the dissenting opinion in that case observed, the law may
have been "clear" when it simply denied recovery altogether for emotional shock. 6 But as catalogued by the dissenting opinion, state
courts had already recognized the unjustified narrowness of the
"clear" rule, and had consequently limited and muddied the rule by
allowing recovery for shock accompanied by physical "impact," then
further allowing recovery for shock even without impact if the plaintiff was in the "zone of danger," and finally allowing recovery in several cases for shock unaccompanied by impact and outside the zone of
danger if an intentional tort to a family member was involved.7 In
sum, the rule's formulation at the time Amaya was decided could
hardly be said to characterize the sort of clarity that made it easy to
predict outcomes.
By characterizing the court's approach in Amaya as rule-based,
Professor Kelso is then able to criticize the court's subsequent opinion
in Dillon v. Legg8 for confusing what was a clear rule with factor balancing.9 However, as illustrated above, there was no clear rule at the

time Amaya was decided, and thus what the California Supreme
Court did in Dillon was not to substitute uncertainty for clarity, but
(for better or worse) to move an already fuzzy line a bit further in the
direction of plaintiffs.
Leaving aside the problem of bias, and assuming for purposes of
discussion that the choice of a rule over a standard does promote efficiency through certainty and predictability, there remains the question
whether that choice, in the context under consideration, is consistent
with our notions of justice. Certainly an efficient set of criteria is an
aspect of a just legal system, but it is just as certainly not the only
aspect. A rule disqualifying all persons with serious disabilities from
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963).
Id. at 527-28 (Peters, L, dissenting).
Id. The majority opinion provides a full discussion of these cases. Id. at 514-25.
441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
Kelso, supra note 1, at 449.
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employment may be efficient, but society has come to accept that justice requires case-by-case consideration of ability to do particular
work.
Indeed, the history of the common law might be described in
terms of a continuing tension, and a continuing swing of the pendulum, between rules and standards within various areas of the law. The
common-law judges developed a rigid, formalistic view of dispute resolution, and along came the equity courts with a more flexible approach. Then chancellors in equity were accused of making decisions
based upon their respective footlengths, or their breakfast menus, and
back came some rules. In more modern times, a tension typically develops between the rules and perceived principles of justice, and
courts begin to allow for exceptions. Some bright law student writes a
law review note observing that the exceptions are so numerous and so
vaguely defined as to "swallow the rule," and the courts proceed to
adopt the multi-factored standards that the bright student has proposed. And so it goes, until someone suggests that the standards provide insufficient predictability, and that a "clear bright line" is needed.
Enter Professor Kelso.
The overall lesson, it seems to me, is that the tension between
categorical and individualized decision making cannot equitably be resolved on the basis of a general preference for one over the other. To
put the matter differently, the tension cannot be resolved by a rule.
What is required, rather, is an area-by-area, doctrine-by-doctrine analysis that takes into account the subtleties of particular legal problems,
the extent to which the area is pervaded by principles of general application, the ability of a rule both to provide predictability and to do
justice, and the respective competence of courts and legislatures. If
that turns out to be a standard, so be it.
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